Closer to Justice: Transferring Cases from the International Criminal Court by Norris, George H.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2010
Closer to Justice: Transferring Cases from the
International Criminal Court
George H. Norris
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Norris, George H., "Closer to Justice: Transferring Cases from the International Criminal Court" (2010). Minnesota Journal of
International Law. 299.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/299
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 12:53 PM 
 
201 
Note 
Closer to Justice: Transferring Cases from the 
International Criminal Court 
George H. Norris* 
The international community continues to struggle with 
how to bring some of the worst war criminals to justice.1  One 
such challenge arises out of the jurisdictional question over who 
should prosecute the leaders of a brutal rebel group responsible 
for widespread displacement and killings in central Africa and 
the kidnapping of thousands of children for use as child 
soldiers.2  On November 30, 2008, Joseph Kony, the leader of 
the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), refused to sign yet another 
peace agreement with the government of Uganda, claiming it 
was a trick to have him arrested and transferred to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).3  Kony’s refusal to sign the 
peace agreement prompted a military response against LRA 
camps, which in turn sparked another round of massacres by 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., Macalester 
College, 2004.  The author would like to thank the staff and editors of the journal for 
their hard work and dedication and his wife for her unending patience, love, and 
support. 
 1. See, e.g., Helen Brady & Barbara Goy, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 569, 601–604 (July 2008) 
(noting issues faced by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in transferring cases to 
courts of national jurisdiction); Okechukwu Oko, The Challenges of International 
Criminal Prosecutions in Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 343 (2008) (examining the 
challenges and limitations of international criminal prosecutions in Africa). 
 2. Alan Boswell, Ugandan Rebel Group Motives Unclear as Terror Campaign 
Expands, VOICE OF AMERICA, Aug. 27, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-
08-27-voa35.cfm; Rachel Irwin, Uganda’s Ability to Try Rebels Questioned, INST. FOR 
WAR AND PEACE REPORTING, Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.iwpr.net/ 
?p=acr&s=f&o=347948&apc_state=henpacr.  
 3. Henry Owuorp, Why Uganda’s Kony Won’t Sign Deal, DAILY NATION 
(Kenya), Apr. 6, 2009, available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/-/1066/ 
557784/-/13pxnvyz/-/index.html; Uganda Rebel Negotiating Team Wants Peace Deal 
Revised, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 28, 2009, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/ 
rwb.nsf/db900SID/SNAA-7VD9KN?OpenDocument. 
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the LRA.4  Kony continues to demand that arrest warrants 
issued by the ICC for the top leaders of the LRA be dropped, and 
he claims that the indictments are the only barrier to a peace 
deal.5  Kony’s demands and the continuing atrocities committed 
by the LRA have fueled debate over both the ICC’s role in 
ongoing conflicts and how to address the potentially 
incompatible aims of bringing peace and achieving justice.6 
Uganda and the ICC are searching for an alternative route 
to end the fighting without completely abandoning the LRA 
indictments.  In response to a request from Uganda, the ICC 
plans to conduct a pre-trial hearing to determine if the cases 
against the LRA should be transferred from the ICC to the High 
Court of Uganda for trial.7  These discussions have highlighted 
a missing piece to the statute which governs the ICC: it is not 
clear exactly how the ICC would actually transfer the 
indictments to the Ugandan courts if it chose to do so.  There is 
no formal mechanism in the Rome Statute to allow the Court to 
transfer jurisdiction of a case.  While the Court will probably be 
able to craft a Ugandan-shaped hole in the existing rules,8 it 
should take the opportunity presented by the 2010 ICC Review 
Conference to adopt a more formal and structured solution.  
This Note will argue that the ICC should add a transfer 
mechanism to shift cases back to courts of national jurisdiction, 
modeled on a similar rule adopted by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
The government of Uganda has tried several different 
methods to end the conflict with the LRA since the rebel group’s 
formation in 1988.9  These efforts, however, have not prevented 
the LRA from continuing to terrorize northern Uganda and the 
 
 4. A Country Adrift, a President Amiss, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2009, at 57; 
Attack ‘Ends Uganda Peace Talks’, BBC NEWS, Dec. 15, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/africa/7783417.stm; Christmas Massacres ‘Killed 400’, BBC NEWS, Dec. 30, 
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7804470.stm. 
 5. Skye Wheeler, Ugandan Rebel Kony Still Refuses to Sign Peace Deal, 
REUTERS, Nov. 30, 2008, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/WAL063121.htm. 
 6. TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY 126–27 (2006). 
 7. Milton Olupot, Pre-Trial of Kony Set, NEW VISION (Uganda), Oct. 28, 2008, 
available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/656873. 
 8. See infra Part II.a. 
 9. The government of Uganda has tried large-scale military operations, 
negotiating with Sudan to stop providing support for the LRA, and multiple peace 
efforts, including a sweeping offer of amnesty.  See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 6, at 47–
52; Attack ‘Ends Uganda Peace Talks’, supra note 4; ALLEN, supra note 6, at 38 
(discussing the formation of the LRA). 
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region.10  In December 2003, the lack of progress led Uganda to 
become the first country to refer a case directly to the ICC when 
Yoweri Museveni, the President of Uganda, asked the ICC to 
investigate potential crimes committed by the LRA.11  On July 
8, 2005, a pre-trial chamber of the Court granted the 
Prosecutor’s request for indictments against five leaders of the 
LRA.12  The referral has not ended the conflict, but it has 
sparked a debate about whether or not the ICC indictments are 
a barrier to peace negotiations.  The indicted leaders have 
repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the ICC indictments as 
a prerequisite for signing any peace agreement.13  The ICC and 
its supporters continue to argue that justice must not be 
sacrificed to the peace process and that the goals of justice and 
peace can work together.14 
As the ICC considers whether to transfer the LRA 
 
 10. See, e.g., A Country Adrift, a President Amiss, supra note 4; DR Congo: 
Protect Civilians From Brutal Rebel Attacks: Killings, Abductions, and Pillaging by 
Lord’s Resistance Army Continue, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Nov. 13, 2008, 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/11/12/congo20193.htm (reporting renewed attacks 
and the abduction of children by the LRA and calling on the United Nations Security 
Council and national governments to increase the number of peacekeepers in the 
northern Congo to protect the civilian population). 
 11. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation 
Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, ICC-20040129-44 (Jan. 
29, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/ 
Press+Releases/2004/ (follow “3” hyperlink at the bottom of the page; then follow 
“President of Uganda” hyperlink); Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army 
Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to the International Criminal 
Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 403, 410–11 (2005). 
 12. Situation in Uganda, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-1-US-Exp, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest Under Article 58 (July 8, 2005) (this 
decision was originally issued under seal; unsealed pursuant to Decision No. ICC-
02/04-01/05-52, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Unsealing of the 
Warrants of Arrest (Oct. 13, 2005)).  Since then, the proceedings against Raska 
Lukwiya were terminated on strong evidence that he had been killed.  Prosecutor v. 
Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Raska Lukwiya, Dominic Ongwen, Case 
No. ICC-02/04-01/05-248, Decision to Terminate the Proceedings Against Raska 
Lukiya (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc297945.pdf. 
 13. Jeffrey Gettleman, Uganda Peace Hinges on Amnesty for Brutality, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at A1; Uganda Rebels in Fresh Truce Call, BBC NEWS,  
Jan. 12, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7824084.stm. 
 14. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo (July 12, 2006) (“It is the view of the Office of the Prosecutor 
and the Government of Uganda that justice and peace have worked together thus far 
and can continue to work together.”).  Cf., Helena Cobban, Think Again: 
International Courts, 153 FOREIGN POL’Y 22, 24 (2006) (arguing that the ICC 
indictments have exacerbated the conflict in Uganda); Uganda Aide Criticizes Court 
Over Warrants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at 20 (quoting a mediator in the conflict, 
“There is now no hope of getting [the LRA] to surrender.”). 
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indictments to the Ugandan judiciary, the experiences of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda provide valuable 
insight into one mechanism to facilitate such a transfer.  As the 
ICTR approached the end of its mandate, it needed to reduce its 
caseload in order to finish on schedule.  It adopted Rule 11 bis, 
which allows the Prosecutor or the Tribunal to request the 
transfer of cases from the ICTR to national courts.15  Since its 
adoption, eight requests have been made to transfer cases, with 
varying degrees of success.16  The transfer requests to move 
cases to Rwanda have been the most interesting in light of the 
ICTR’s relationship with the country and the continuing impact 
of the potential transfer of cases on Rwandan law and the 
judiciary.  The first Appeals Court decision on a motion to 
transfer a case to Rwanda was handed down on October 8, 2008.  
The decision and other subsequent requests provide a valuable 
backdrop to consider a similar mechanism for the ICC.17 
Part I of this Note discusses the Rwandan genocide, the 
creation of the ICC, and the ongoing conflict with the LRA.  Part 
I also provides a detailed look at the ICTR 11 bis decisions, 
focusing on the criteria employed and its impact on the 
Rwandan government.  Part II explores the ICC and its 
response to the evolving situation with the LRA in Uganda.  
Part III analyzes the application of a transfer mechanism to the 
ICC and considers modifications that could further increase its 
effectiveness in that context.  Finally, the addendum contains 
proposed language for the transfer mechanism. 
This Note argues that adopting a transfer mechanism 
would be valuable to the ICC for at least five reasons.  First, it 
would establish a clear framework for addressing Uganda’s 
request to regain jurisdiction over the LRA cases.  Second, it 
would further the development of specific guidelines and best 
practices, serving as both a benchmark of international 
legitimacy and a goal toward which national judicial systems 
can strive.  It would also give the ICC leverage for improving 
national judiciaries in countries where it has ongoing cases.  A 
third advantage stems from a growing body of scholarship 
 
 15. Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Amendments Adopted at the Plenary 
Session of the Judges, 2-3, 15th Plenary Session, (May 15, 2005) (adopting Rule 
11 bis). 
 16. See infra Part I.A.3.b. 
 17. Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on 
the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis (Oct. 8, 
2008). 
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demonstrating that the impact of war crimes prosecutions 
increases when the accused is tried as close as possible to those 
most affected by the crimes.18  A transfer mechanism would 
allow cases to be moved closer to victims, and could take into 
account improvements to the judicial system between the 
indictment and the actual trial.  Fourth, it provides the ICC 
with a flexible tool for alleviating potential caseload concerns as 
the Court obtains jurisdiction over more crimes, gains 
credibility, and potentially draws more referrals from ongoing 
conflicts around the world.  Finally, it could provide a layer of 
protection against the perception that indictments are 
politically motivated, adding another argument to convince 
major countries that have not ratified the Rome Statute to do so.  
At the very least, it could help bring such countries to the 
negotiating table at the ICC Review Conference, scheduled for 
2010, in Kampala, Uganda.19 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 
1.  A Brief History of the Rwandan Genocide 
On April 6, 1994, the plane of J. Habyarimana, the 
President of Rwanda, was shot down as he returned from a 
meeting with African heads of state.20  President Habyarimana 
and several other important figures died in the crash.21  The 
incident triggered a wave of violence resulting in the slaughter 
of more than 800,000 people in a little over three months, with 
 
 18. See, e.g., Jean-Marie Kamatali, From the ICTR to ICC: Learning From the 
ICTR Experience in Bringing Justice to Rwandans, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP.  
L. 89, 90–93 (2005) (arguing that trials are far more effective if they are organized in 
the country where the crimes occurred with more involvement from the local 
individuals and organizations). 
 19. Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR], Venue of the Review Conference, 
Res. ICC-ASP/7/Res.2, available at, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ 
Resolutions/ICC-ASP-ASP7-Res-02-ENG.pdf. 
 20. ALISON DES FORGES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE 
STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 181–82 (1999) (noting that the party responsible for 
shooting down the plane remains a highly contested and largely uninvestigated 
issue); ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF 
HUMANITY IN RWANDA 220 (2003). 
 21. DES FORGES, supra note 20, at 181–82 (stating that Cyprien Ntaryamira, 
the President of Burundi, and General Nsabimana, the Chief of Staff of the 
Rwandan army also died in the crash). 
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most of the victims from the minority Tutsi population.22  A 
brief discussion of the history leading up to the conflict provides 
a useful context to understand the current tensions surrounding 
the ICTR prosecutions and the issues raised by the potential 
transfer of cases to the Rwandan judiciary. 
The ethnic categorization and subsequent hostility between 
the Hutu and Tutsi developed over the course of the twentieth 
century and significantly intensified when Belgium became the 
colonial power in the 1920s and 1930s.23  The Belgians cemented 
growing separation between the two ethnic groups by decreeing 
that only Tutsi could be officials, giving them increased power 
over the Hutu.24  The Belgians also registered the entire 
population and issued ethnic identity cards which all adult 
Rwandans were required to carry.25  Domination by the 
minority Tutsi population, with the support of Belgium, 
continued until the end of the colonial era in the 1950s.  The 
departure of the Belgians led to the ascendency of the Hutu in 
elections in 1960, which was followed by the often violent 
expulsion of many Tutsi from regions that had previously been 
predominately Hutu.26  Many of the Tutsi fled and became 
refugees on the margins of neighboring countries.27 
A generation later, Tutsi who grew up as refugees formed 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) with the goal of 
overthrowing President Habyarimana and establishing a new 
government.28  In 1990, the RPF crossed the border and 
attacked Rwanda.29  The RPF attack was followed by years of 
 
 22. Id. at 15.  For a detailed analysis of the genocide, see id.; DALLAIRE, supra 
note 20; PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE 
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998). 
 23. Prior to the Belgian colonization there was some fluidity between the Hutu 
and Tutsi groups which had generally split along occupational lines.  DES FORGES, 
supra note 20, at 32–35.  The Tutsi were pastoralists who also held more power and 
the Hutu cultivated the land, but the categories were not completely fixed.  Id. 
 24. Id. at 35. 
 25. Id. at 36–38.  After the registration, approximately 15% of the population 
identified as Tutsi, 84% as Hutu, and 1% as Twa (a distinct ethnic group).  Id. at 37. 
 26. Id. at 38–40. 
 27. More than 300,000 Tutsi fled abroad.  Id. at 39–40 (citing GÉRARD PUNIER, 
THE RWANDA CRISIS, HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 62 (1995)).  By the late 1980s, the 
population had grown to approximately 600,000.  Id. at 48 (citing André Guichaoua, 
Vers deux génerations de réfugiés Rwandais?, in LES CRISES POLITIQUES AU BURUNDI 
ET AU RWANDA, 1993-1994: ANALYSES, FAITS ET DOCUMENTS, 343 (1995)).  Those 
Tutsi who ended up in Tanzania were the only refugees who were encouraged to 
integrate into the local population.  Id. at 48. 
 28. Id. at 48. 
 29. Id. at 49.  Many of the Tutsi in Uganda were part of Yoweri Museveni’s 
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sporadic fighting between the two sides, with numerous cease-
fire agreements signed and broken.30  In 1994, as attempts to 
implement a peace agreement slowly unwound, the President’s 
death set off a final round of violence.31  The Hutu targeted and 
killed 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in what the ICTR later 
found to be “a campaign of mass killing intended to destroy, in 
whole or at least in very large part, Rwanda’s Tutsi 
population”—the  definition of genocide.32  By the end of the 
conflict, the RPF had taken full control of the country and they 
have continued to dominate its politics since.33  The RPF drove 
approximately two million Hutu refugees, including many of 
those who planned and committed the genocide, into 
neighboring countries.34  Several thousand still remain in what 
is now the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) as an extremist insurgency destabilizing the region.35  
 
National Resistance Army (NRA), which put him in power in Uganda in 1986, 
fueling much of the ethnic tension that led to the creation of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army.  Paul Kagame was the deputy head of military intelligence for the NRA.  Id. 
at 48.  See also infra Part I.C. 
 30. E.g., DES FORGES, supra note 20 at 106, 109, 123, 180.  This included the 
negotiation of the Arusha Peace Agreement with the goal of creating a broad based 
transitional government incorporating the RPF and numerous other political parties 
into the government.  The Arusha Peace Agreement was the framework agreement 
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was meant to help 
implement, established by S.C. Res. 872, U.N. Doc S/Res/872 (Oct. 5, 1993).  See also 
DALLAIRE, supra note 20, at 96, 100–10. 
 31. See, e.g., DALLAIRE, supra note 20, at 212, 221–62. 
 32. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, ¶ 35 (June 16, 
2006) (recognizing that “[t]he fact of the Rwandan genocide is a part of world 
history, a fact as certain as any other, a classic instance of a ‘fact of common 
knowledge’.”).  See also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
S.C. Res. 955 art. 2, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (defining genocide). 
 33. See supra Part I.A.1.  See also, DALLAIRE, supra note 20, at 474–76 
(commenting on the RPF victory). 
 34. DALLAIRE, supra note 20, at 465, 488, 493–94, 518; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
RENEWED CRISIS IN NORTH KIVU 14 (Oct. 2007), available at http://hrw.org/reports/ 
2007/drc1007/drc1007webwcover.pdf.  Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo in 1997.  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 
2009 (2009), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
geos/cg.html. 
 35. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RENEWED CRISIS IN NORTH KIVU, supra note 34, at 
14–15.  Fighting in the Eastern DRC intensified in November and December 2008 
which led to joint military operations by the Rwandan and DRC governments in an 
attempt to quell the fighting.  Stephanie McCrummen, Rwandan Troops Enter 
Congo to Find Hutu Militia Leaders, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2009, at A3; Stephanie 
McCrummen, Congo, Rwanda Call Joint Offensive a Success, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 
2009, at A8.  Many of the Hutu rebels were allowed to return to Rwanda in an 
amnesty program.  Stephanie McCrummen, For Rwandans, Fragile Acts of Faith: 
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During the campaign, many international humanitarian law 
violations were committed by both sides.36 
2.  Structure of the ICTR and Rule 11 bis 
Reports by the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Rwanda and a 
Commission of Experts established by the U.N. Security Council 
concluded that genocide occurred in Rwanda.37  The reports led 
the Security Council to establish the ICTR on November 8, 
1994, with Security Council Resolution 955.38  The ICTR’s 
mandate is to “prosecute persons responsible for genocide and 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens 
responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in 
the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994.”39 
The Tribunal is located in Arusha, Tanzania and has three 
Trial Chambers where cases are heard by three-judge panels.40  
The first trial began in January 1997.41  The Court’s mandate 
has been extended four times, most recently in July 2009, and it 
is now expected to complete all cases at the trial level by the end 
of 2010.42  As of May 2009, the Tribunal completed the trials of 
 
Returning From Years in Congo’s Bush, Hutu Rebels Seek Their Place in a 
Homeland Struggling to Forge a New Unity, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2008, at A1.  It is 
unclear how many rebels have actually returned to Rwanda and some militia groups 
are still active in the region.  35,000 Flee Renewed Clashes in Eastern DRC, RADIO 
NETH. WORLDWIDE, July 25, 2009, http://www.rnw.nl/int-justice/article/35000-flee-
renewed-clashes-east-drcongo. 
 36. DES FORGES, supra note 20, at 13–14, 301–02, 701–35; DALLAIRE, supra 
note 20, at 469. 
 37. The Special Rapporteur for Rwanda, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, Annex I and Annex II U.N. Doc. 
S/1994/1157, A/49/508, (Oct. 13, 1994).  The Secretary General, Preliminary Report 
by the Independent Commission of Experts, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (Oct. 4, 1994). 
 38. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 32; DES FORGES, supra note 20, at 737–78. 
 39. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 32, at art. 1. 
 40. Id. art. 11 (Composition of the Chambers); S.C. Res. 1512, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1512 (Oct. 27, 2003) (amending art. 11). 
 41. Erik Møse, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 920, 920 
(2005) (containing a detailed history of the accomplishments of the Tribunal divided 
into its separate mandates and describing some of the difficulties in establishing the 
Tribunal). 
 42. S.C. Res. 1878, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1878 (July 7, 2009).  See also S.C.  
Res. 1824, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1824 (July 18, 2008).  Even that deadline is questionable 
with the capture of Idelphonse Nizeyimana in October, 2009.  Jeffrey Gettleman, 
Major Suspect in Genocide of Rwandans is Captured, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A8. 
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forty-four accused, including six acquittals.43  Fourteen other 
accused were awaiting judgments in five cases and ten were still 
involved in ongoing trials.44  As part of its Completion Strategy 
to finish all of its initial trials, the Tribunal added the authority 
to transfer cases to competent national jurisdictions.45  In May 
2005, the Tribunal established Rule 11 bis in its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence to facilitate these transfers.46 
Under Rule 11 bis, a Trial Chamber may refer a case to a 
competent national jurisdiction on its own motion (proprio 
motu) or at the request of the Prosecutor.47  The Prosecutor or 
the accused may appeal that decision.48  However, discretion to 
transfer cases is not unlimited; the highest profile cases cannot 
be transferred to other courts.49  Therefore, when considering a 
transfer request, the Prosecutor must first consider the status 
and extent of a defendant’s alleged involvement in light of the 
ICTR’s mandate to try those who were in positions of leadership 
and who bear the greatest responsibility for the genocide.50 
Under Rule 11 bis, cases may be transferred to the country 
where the crime was committed, the country where the accused 
was arrested, or any other country with jurisdiction that is 
“willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case.”51  The 
final provision is a catchall allowing the Tribunal to consider 
transferring cases to countries that have adopted either 
universal jurisdiction laws or specific laws that provide 
jurisdiction to try crimes within the mandate of the ICTR and 
 
 43. President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Report on the 
Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Annex 1 
(A), U.N. Doc. S/2009/247 (May 14, 2009) [hereinafter Completion Strategy 2009]. 
 44. Id. Annex 1 (B)–(D).  An additional six accused are waiting for trial, one 
will be retried and thirteen fugitives remain at large; id. Annex 2–4.  Full cases are 
available at www.ictr.org/default (follow “Cases” hyperlink). 
 45. President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Report on the 
Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶¶ 46–50, 
U.N. Doc. S/2008/322 (May 13, 2008) [hereinafter Completion Strategy 2008]. 
 46. Amendments Adopted at the Plenary Session of the Judges, supra note 15, 
at 2–3. 
 47. ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(B). 
 48. Id. at 11 bis(H). 
 49. Completion Strategy 2008, supra note 45, ¶ 46 (“In determining whether an 
individual should be tried at the Tribunal, the Prosecutor considers, among other 
things, the alleged status and extent of the participation of the individual during the 
genocide, the alleged connection that the individual may have had with other cases, 
the need to cover the major geographical areas of Rwanda, the availability of 
evidence with regard to the individual concerned and the availability of investigative 
material for transmission to a State for national prosecution.”). 
 50. Id. 
 51. ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(A)(iii). 
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other international tribunals.52 
The analysis does not end with a determination that a 
country has jurisdiction to accept a case.  Under Rule 11 bis, the 
Trial Chamber must also “satisfy itself that the accused will 
receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned and that 
the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.”53  In 
addition, if a case is transferred the Prosecutor can monitor the 
subsequent proceedings in the national court to ensure a fair 
trial and has the ability to revoke jurisdiction if necessary.54  
Rule 11 bis and its case law provide a comprehensive framework 
for analyzing transfer requests while ensuring that the accused 
receives a fair trial. 
3.  Transferring Cases from the ICTR in Practice 
a.  Transferring Cases to Europe 
Since Rule 11 bis was adopted, the Prosecutor has 
requested the referral of eight cases to national jurisdictions.55  
Only two requests have been granted.56  The two successful 
referrals, both to France, were in the cases against Wenceslas 
Munyeshyaka and Laurent Bucyibaruta.57 
The transfer request to France was a very straightforward 
analysis.  The Court found that France had jurisdiction over the 
cases on the basis of a French law specifically adopted to 
prosecute individuals for crimes within the mandate of the 
ICTR.58  Jurisdiction was also confirmed by the French courts59 
 
 52. E.g., France has adopted such a provision; discussed in more detail in the 
transfer cases for Wenceslas Munyeshyaka and Laurent Bucyibaruta, see infra Part 
I.3.a. 
 53. ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(C) (“In determining whether to refer the case in 
accordance with paragraph (A), the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the 
accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned and that the 
death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.”). 
 54. ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(D)(iv), (F).  For full text, see infra note 95. 
 55. Completion Strategy 2009, supra note 43, ¶ 29; Completion Strategy 2008, 
supra note 45, ¶50; President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Report on 
the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶¶ 29–
30, U.N. Doc. S/2007/676 (Nov. 20, 2007). 
 56. Completion Strategy 2008, supra note 45, ¶ 50. 
 57. Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-97-I, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to 
France (Nov. 20, 2007); Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of Laurent Bucyibaruta’s 
Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007). 
 58. Law No. 96-432 of May 22, 1996, arts. 1–2.  Journal officiel de la 
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and the crime of genocide is recognized in the French Criminal 
Code.60  After determining that France had jurisdiction over all 
of the crimes charged in the indictment, the Court examined the 
defendant’s fair trial rights in France61 and ensured that the 
death penalty would not be carried out.62  Finally, France had 
an adequate witness protection scheme and would allow the 
ICTR to monitor proceedings pursuant to Rule 11 bis(D)(iv).63 
The issue of jurisdiction has been much more difficult in 
attempts to transfer cases to other European countries.  For 
example, the Prosecutor’s first motion to transfer Michel 
Bagaragaza’s case to Norway was denied at both the trial level64 
and on appeal.65  Norway has adopted universal jurisdiction 
laws, but Norway’s body of criminal law does not explicitly 
address the crime of genocide.  Norwegian officials were going to 
prosecute the case under a homicide statute,66 but neither the 
Trial Chamber nor the Appeals Chamber was willing to transfer 
the case to a jurisdiction that was unable to charge the crime as 
a serious violation of international humanitarian law.67  The 
 
République française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 23, 1996, p. 7695 (Fr.).  
Universal jurisdiction is rooted in the idea that “every state has an interest in 
exercising jurisdiction to combat egregious offenses that states universally have 
condemned.”  James Paul Benoit, The Evolution of Universal Jurisdiction Over War 
Crimes, 53 NAVAL L. REV. 259, 261–62 (2006) (quoting Bartram S. Brown, The 
Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 384 (2001)). 
 59. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-97-I ¶ 10. 
 60. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art., Article 211-1 (Fr).  To complete jurisdiction the 
accused also had to be in France; this requirement was met in both cases.  
Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-97-I ¶ 16. 
 61. Munyeshyaka, ICTR-2005-97-I ¶¶ 20–24.  France has ratified numerous 
international instruments and has the guarantee of a fair trial in their domestic law.  
Id. 21–23. 
 62. Id. ¶ 18 (citing France’s ratification of Protocol No. 13 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which 
proscribes the death penalty in all circumstances and Article 66-1 of the French 
Constitution that was added in 2007 forbidding the death penalty). 
 63. ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(D)(iv); Munyeshyaka, ICTR-2005-97-I ¶¶ 25–30. 
 64. Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza (Bagaragaza Trial Court), Case No. ICTR-2005-
86-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for Referral to the Kingdom of 
Norway, ¶ 16 (May 19, 2006).  Bagaragaza was charged with conspiracy to commit 
genocide, genocide, and, in the alternative, complicity in genocide.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 65. Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza (Bagaragaza Appeal), Case No. ICTR-2005-86-
AR11bis, Decision on Rule 11bis Appeal (Aug. 30, 2006). 
 66. Bagaragaza Appeal, ICTR-2005-86-AR11bis ¶¶ 13–14 (citing Amicus 
Curiae Brief filed by the Kingdom of Norway, 26 June 2006).  The homicide statute 
also carried a maximum punishment of twenty-one years in jail, which the 
prosecution was willing to accept.  Bagaragaza Trial Court, ICTR-2005-86-R11bis ¶ 
14. 
 67. Bagaragaza Appeal, ICTR-2005-86-AR11bis ¶¶ 17–18; Bagaragaza Trial 
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Court held that the importance of seeking a conviction for 
genocide outweighed the fact that a significant jail sentence, in 
line with other ICTR convictions, could have been imposed. 
In a second attempt to transfer Bagaragaza’s case, the 
Prosecutor initially succeeded with a motion to transfer the case 
to the Netherlands.68  The Netherlands had already successfully 
prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced three non-nationals for 
war crimes.69  The Trial Chamber also found that the country 
would provide a fair trial, adequate witness protection, would 
not impose the death penalty, and would allow the proceedings 
to be monitored by the ICTR.70  Less than three months later, 
however, a Dutch court rejected jurisdiction for a separate, but 
similar, genocide case involving a Rwandan because there were 
no Dutch victims.71  Concluding that the Dutch court would not 
find jurisdiction for Bagaragaza either, the court granted the 
Prosecutor’s request to cancel the transfer order.72 
b.  Transferring Cases to Rwanda 
The Prosecutor faced an entirely different set of issues with 
the requests to transfer three cases to Rwanda in May and June 
 
Court, ICTR-2005-86-R11bis ¶ 16. 
 68. Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza (Bagaragaza Netherlands), Case No. ICTR-2005-
86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Indictment to the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (Apr. 13, 2007). 
 69. Bagaragaza Netherlands, ICTR-2005-86-11bis ¶ 13.  The Netherlands 
claimed jurisdiction over the case through article 4a of the Dutch Criminal Code.  Id. 
¶ 17 (“[T]he Dutch criminal law is applicable to anyone against whom prosecution 
has been transferred from a foreign State to the Netherlands on the basis of a treaty 
from which the power of the Netherlands to prosecute follows.”). 
 70. Id. ¶¶ 31–39. 
 71. District Court Intermediary Decision in the Case of J.M., The Court of the 
Hague, ¶ 24, (July 24, 2007), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/ 
DEF/9/661.html.  See also, Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza (Bagaragaza Rule 11 Bis(F) & 
(G)), Case No. ICTR-2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Extremely Urgent 
Motion for Revocation of the Referral to the Kingdom of the Netherlands Pursuant 
to Rule 11 Bis(F) & (G), ¶ 3, (Aug. 17, 2007).  Joseph Mpambara was eventually 
found guilty of torture and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment by the District 
Court of the Hague.  Rwandees wegens foltering veroordeeld tot 20 jaar 
gevangenisstraf (Mar. 23, 2009) (Dutch), available at http://www.rechtspraak.nl/ 
Actualiteiten/Rwandees+wegens+foltering+veroordeeld+tot+20+jaar+gevangenisstraf.htm.
See also, Mpambara, Joseph, the Hague Justice Portal, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/ 
eCache/DEF/9/660.html. 
 72. Bagaragaza Rule 11 Bis(F) & (G), ICTR-2005-86-11bis ¶¶ 11–12.  
Bagaragaza eventually plead guilty to complicity in genocide.  Press Release, Int’l 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Bagaragaza Pleads Guilty (Sept. 17, 2009), available 
at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2009/607.html. 
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of 2008.73  Each motion was denied by a separate Trial 
Chamber.74  Two further transfer requests were denied at the 
end of 2008.75  In denying all of the requests to transfer cases to 
Rwanda, the Tribunal set a high bar for fair trial rights and 
respect for accepted international standards of detention.  The 
Appeals Chamber upheld the denial of transfer in the case of 
Yussuf Munyakazi and the decision is illustrative of the 
concerns voiced by all the Trial Chambers.76 
Jurisdiction was not in dispute in any of the cases.  Rwanda 
was the state in which the crimes were committed and the 
country recently abolished the death penalty.77  Each of the 
transfer requests hinged on 11 bis(C): whether “the accused will 
receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned . . . .”78  
Specifically, the chambers were concerned about the defendant’s 
 
 73. Prosecutor v. Munyakazi (Munyakazi Trial Court), Case No. ICTR-97-36-
R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of 
Rwanda (May 28, 2008); Prosecutor v. Hategekimana (Hategekimana Trial Court), 
Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of 
the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda (June 19, 2008); Prosecutor 
v. Kanyarukiga (Kanyarukiga Trial Court), Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision 
on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (June 6, 2008). 
 74. Munyakazi Trial Court, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶ 67; Hategekimana Trial 
Court, ICTR-00-55B-R11bis ¶ 78; Kanyarukiga Trial Court, ICTR-2002-78-R11bis ¶ 
104. 
 75. Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on 
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (Nov. 17, 2008); 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-01-67-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda (Dec. 16, 2008). 
 76. Prosecutor v. Munyakazi (Munyakazi Appeal), Case No. ICTR-97-36-
R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under 
Rule 11bis (Oct. 8, 2008).  The standard of review for 11 bis decisions is discernible 
error.  Id. ¶ 5.  The Appeals Chamber also confirmed the denial of transfer in the 
cases against Hategekimana and Kanyarukiga.  Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case 
No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis , Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on 
Referral Under Rule 11bis (Dec. 4, 2008); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. 
ICTR-2002-78-11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on 
Referral Under Rule 11bis (Oct. 30, 2008).  Additionally, the Trial Chamber in the 
case against Hategekimana was “not satisfied that Rwanda’s legal framework 
criminalizes command responsibility.”  Hategekimana Trial Court, ICTR-00-55B-
R11bis ¶ 78. 
 77. ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(A)(i) (“If an indictment has been confirmed, 
whether or not the accused is in the custody of the Tribunal, the President may 
designate a Trial Chamber which shall determine whether the case should be 
referred to the authorities of a State: (i) In whose territory the crime was committed; 
. . .”).  See, e.g., Munyakazi Trial Court, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶¶ 15–16.  Rwanda 
repealed the death penalty in Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25/07/2007 Relating to the 
Abolition of the Death Penalty [Rwanda] 31/2007 (July 25, 2007), available at 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46bada1c2.html. 
 78. ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(C). 
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access to witnesses, both within Rwanda and from outside the 
country, and the potential penalty of life in solitary 
confinement.79 
In evaluating the chances that the accused would receive 
fair trials in Rwanda, the Tribunal was particularly concerned 
about equal access to witnesses for the prosecution and defense.  
All three Trial Chambers found that the potential disparity in 
access was grounds to deny the transfer.80  The Tribunal 
credited reports from witnesses who had testified both in 
Rwanda and before the Tribunal, stating that defense witnesses 
“experienced threats, torture, arrests and detentions, and, in 
some instances, were killed.”81  The Tribunal was concerned 
that defense witnesses would not travel to Rwanda because 
their safety could not be guaranteed.  Not having equal access to 
witnesses would severely undermine the fair trial rights of the 
accused. 
The RPF has remained in power since the end of the 
genocide and that political reality was a major factor in the fear 
expressed by potential defense witnesses.82  Paul Kagame was 
the leader of the RPF forces during the civil war between 1990 
and 1994, and he was reelected in 2003 to a second seven-year 
term as president with 95% of the vote.83  His government has 
actively limited speech concerning the genocide and ethnic 
tensions.84  In 2002, a broadly worded law was passed against 
“divisionism,” and in June 2008, another similar law was passed 
 
 79. Munyakazi Appeal, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶¶ 20, 50.  The chambers view the 
detention conditions as part of the underlying fairness of the justice system.  See, 
e.g., Hategekimana Trial Court, ICTR-00-55B-R11bis ¶ 75.  See also, Rwanda Killers 
to Face Solitary, BBC NEWS, May 28, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
8070306.stm. 
 80. Munyakazi Trial Court, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶¶ 53–66; Hategekimana Trial 
Court, ICTR-00-55B-R11bis ¶¶ 61–71; Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga (Kanyarukiga 
Trial Court), Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for 
Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶¶ 63–81 (June 6, 2008).  See also, Munyakazi 
Appeal, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶¶ 37–43 (upholding Trial Court’s ruling and reasoning). 
 81. Munyakazi Appeal, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶ 37. 
 82. See Munyakazi Trial Court, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶¶ 53–66; Hategekimana 
Trial Court, ICTR-00-55B-R11bis ¶¶ 61–71; Kanyarukiga Trial Court, Case No. 
ICTR-2002-78-R11bis ¶¶ 37–43. 
 83. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2009 (2009), 
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 
rw.html.  The RPF political party received 78.8% of the vote in the legislative 
election.  Id. 
 84. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL 
REFORM IN RWANDA 34–43 (2008). 
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against spreading “genocide ideology.”85  In addition to fears for 
their safety from the local community, witnesses for the defense 
have said that they are afraid testifying could lead to 
prosecution under either of these laws or before the gacaca 
courts.86  Most of the defense witnesses reside outside of 
Rwanda and appear unwilling to travel to Rwanda to testify.87 
All three Trial Chambers also found the potential sentence 
of life imprisonment in solitary confinement sufficient 
alternative grounds to deny transferring the cases.88  The 
Rwandan government argued that the Transfer Law, 
specifically passed to handle cases from the ICTR, controlled in 
this situation and only allowed life imprisonment, absent the 
“special circumstances” that could lead to solitary confinement 
under other Rwandan law.89  The Appeals Chamber was 
unconvinced and found the ambiguous legal situation sufficient 
to warrant denial of the transfer.90 
Some of the Trial Chambers also articulated individual 
concerns unique to that chamber.  For example, the Munyakazi 
Trial Chamber raised the issue of potential interference with 
the judiciary by the Rwandan government, based, in part, on an 
amicus brief submitted by Human Rights Watch.91  The Appeals 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Munyakazi Appeal, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶ 37; Munyakazi Trial Court, ICTR-
97-36-R11bis ¶¶ 53–66.  The gacaca courts were local, informal courts created to 
deal with the large number of genocide charges within Rwanda.  For more 
information, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL 
REFORM IN RWANDA, supra note 84, at 17–19; Bert Ingelaere, The gacaca Courts in 
Rwanda, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT 
32–58 (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance ed., 2008). 
 87. Munyakazi Appeal, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶¶ 40–41; Munyakazi Trial Court, 
ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶¶ 63–66.  The Courts also dismissed the idea of having the 
majority of the defense witnesses testify by video-link.  If the majority of the 
prosecution’s witnesses testify in person, they found that this difference violated the 
equality of arms.  Munyakazi Appeal, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶ 65; Munyakazi Trial 
Court, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶ 42. 
 88. Prosecutor v. Hategekimana (Hategekimana Trial Court), Case No. ICTR-
00-55B-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of 
Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda, ¶ 25 (June 19, 2008); Prosecutor v. 
Kanyarukiga (Kanyarukiga Trial Court), Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis, Decision 
on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda ¶¶ 95–96 (June 6, 
2008); Munyakazi Trial Court, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶ 22. 
 89. Munyakazi Appeal, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶¶ 12–15; Organic Law No. 11/2007 
of 16 March 2007 Concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of Rwanda from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and From Other States [Rwanda], 
11/2007 (Mar. 16, 2007), available at www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/476644652.html. 
 90. Munyakazi Appeal, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶ 20. 
 91. Munyakazi Trial Court, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶¶ 48–49, 67.  For a detailed 
account of the issues raised by Human Rights Watch, see generally, HUMAN RIGHTS 
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Court was not convinced by the analysis, however, and 
overturned the trial court’s finding.92  The other two Trial 
Chambers acknowledged the concern of pressure on the 
judiciary, but were not persuaded that the issue rose to the level 
necessary to deny transfer.93  The Appeals Chamber also noted 
that the monitoring and revocation safeguards built into 
Rule 11 bis would impact the availability and protection of 
witnesses.94  These provisions explicitly allow for the Prosecutor 
to send observers to monitor the proceedings in the national 
court and to request that a Trial Chamber revoke the transfer if 
necessary.95 
B.  CREATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
The concept of a permanent international tribunal goes 
back to at least the 1940s, where it was originally envisioned as 
a forum for trying people charged under the Genocide 
Convention.96  At that time, draft structures for a court were 
even prepared by the United Nations.97  The idea did not gain 
sufficient political traction to become a reality, however, until 
the 1990s.  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
 
WATCH, LAW AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM IN RWANDA, supra note 
84. 
 92. Munyakazi Appeal, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶ 50. 
 93. Id. ¶¶ 26–31.  
 94. Id. ¶¶ 30, 44.  No mention is made in Rule 11 bis of what would happen to 
these provisions in the likely event that the transfer cases would still be on going 
after the Tribunal’s mandate expires.  ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(D)(iv), (F).  The 
Appeals Chamber noted that the Prosecutor had arranged for the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights to undertake the monitoring 
responsibility.  Munyakazi Appeal, ICTR-97-36-R11bis ¶ 30. 
 95. Rule 11 bis(D)(iv) and (F) state:  
(D)(iv) the Prosecutor may send observers to monitor the proceedings in 
 the courts of the State concerned on his or her behalf. . . . 
(F) At any time after an order has been issued pursuant to this Rule and 
before the accused is found guilty or acquitted by a court in the State 
concerned, the Trial Chamber may, at the request of the Prosecutor 
and upon having given to the authorities of the State concerned the 
opportunity to be heard, revoke the order and make a formal request 
for deferral within the terms of Rule 10. 
ICTR R. P. Evid. 11 bis(D)(iv), (F). 
 96. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
art. VI, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 97. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 8–9 (2nd ed. 2004). 
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Court (ICC)98 was signed by 120 states on July 17, 1998.99  It 
was swiftly ratified by the required sixty states and entered into 
force on July 1, 2002.100  As of July 2009, 110 countries had 
ratified the Statute.101  By June 2003, the first judges of the 
Court and the first prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, were 
sworn in, and the first trial began in January 2009.102 
In order to hear a case, the ICC must have jurisdiction, the 
case must meet one of the three triggering mechanisms, and it 
must survive a determination of admissibility.103  The manner 
in which cases find their way to the Court has a significant 
impact on how a transfer mechanism to a national judicial 
system would operate. 
The Court’s jurisdiction turns on subject matter, time, 
person, and location.  The preamble of the Statute envisions the 
Court addressing “unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity,” and “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.”104  The 
Court’s jurisdiction covers genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and aggression.105  Article 12 limits the Court’s 
 
 98. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
 99. SCHABAS, supra note 97, at 18 (noting that twenty-one countries abstained 
and seven voted against, including the United States, Israel, and China). 
 100. Id. at 19–20. 
 101. International Criminal Court: The States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2009) (“As of 
21 July 2009, 110 countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute . . . .”). 
 102. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S FIRST YEARS 4 (2008).  Press Release, Int’l 
Criminal Court, Opening of the First Trial of the Court on Monday 26 January 2009: 
For the First Time in the History of International Law the Victims Will Fully 
Participate in the Proceedings (Jan. 23, 2009), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/ (follow “6” hyperlink at the 
bottom of the page; then follow “Opening of the First Trial of the Court” hyperlink).  
For more on the history and creation of the Court, see generally, M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 443 (1999); Adriaan Bos, From the 
International Law Commission to the Rome Conference (1994-1998), in 1 THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 35–65 (Antonio 
Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R. W. D. Jones, eds., 2002); THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); 
SCHABAS, supra note 97, at 1–25. 
 103. See SCHABAS, supra note 97, at 68. 
 104. Rome Statute, supra note 98, pmbl. 
 105. Id. art. 5.  Articles 6, 7, and 8 further define genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes respectively.  Jurisdiction and a definition of the crime of 
aggression have not yet been adopted and will not be considered until a review 
conference to be held in 2010.  See id. arts. 121, 123; SCHABAS, supra note 97, at 31–
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jurisdiction to crimes committed in the territory of a state party 
to the Statute or to nationals of those states who commit crimes 
in other countries.106  Temporally, the ICC cannot hear any 
cases that occurred before the Statute entered into force for the 
particular country.107 
In addition to meeting these requirements, the ICC’s 
jurisdiction can only be triggered in one of three ways: voluntary 
referral by a state party to the Statute, referral by the Security 
Council, or through a proprio motu examination by the 
Prosecutor and approved by a pre-trial chamber of the Court.108  
As of August 2009, the ICC had three open investigations 
referred from States, including the situation in Uganda, and one 
investigation referred by the Security Council.109 
Finally, the Court must make an admissibility 
determination in which the Prosecutor looks at the gravity of 
the allegations and the complementarity of prosecution with 
national courts.110  To assess the gravity of a situation, the 
 
34.  For several proposed options, see id. 
 106. Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 12.  States which are not party to the 
Statute may also accept the jurisdiction of the Court on an ad hoc basis with respect 
to a specific crime by lodging a declaration with the Registrar.  Id. art. 12(3).  This 
method has been followed by Côte d’Ivoire with respect to crimes committed on its 
territory since September 19, 2002, though the text of the request was not disclosed.  
Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Registrar Confirms that the Republic of Côte 
d’Ivoire has Accepted the Jurisdiction of the Court, (Feb. 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/FA0D49A0-69D4-4676-9E77-567B25321CBA.htm. 
 107. For the original sixty states, this occurred when the last ratification was 
deposited on July 1, 2002.  See Rome Statute, supra note 98, arts. 11, 24, 126(1).  For 
subsequent states, the Statute comes into force about two months after their 
ratification of the Statute. 
For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Statute 
after the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, the Statute shall enter into force on the first day of 
the month after the 60th day following the deposit by such State of its 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 126(2).  See also SCHABAS, supra note 97, at 69. 
 108. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S FIRST YEARS, supra note 102, at 37–38.  Ex 
proprio motu (Latin for “of one’s own accord”) is a motion initiated by the Prosecutor.  
Id. at 37; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 109. The other two state referrals are from to the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and the Central African Republic.  The Security Council referred the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan.  Int’l Criminal Court: Situations and Cases, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (last visited Aug. 30, 
2009).  Under Article 16, the Security Council also has the ability to defer 
investigation or prosecution for up to twelve months with unlimited renewal.  Rome 
Statute, supra note 98, art. 16.  See also SCHABAS, supra note 97, at 82–85. 
 110. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK 
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Prosecutor “considers the scale, nature, manner of commission, 
and impact of the crimes”111 to ensure that a particular case 
justifies the Court’s attention.112  The admissibility 
determination occurs at two separate stages, once when the 
Prosecutor makes the decision to open an investigation and 
again when the Prosecutor asks for a specific indictment from a 
pre-trial chamber.113 
Complementarity is based on whether a “State is unwilling 
or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.”114  Unwillingness is determined by examining 
whether the State’s actions are meant to shield a person from 
criminal responsibility, whether there is an unjustifiable delay, 
whether the proceedings are impartial, and whether they are 
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.”115  Inability to prosecute a case is determined by 
considering “whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system the State” is able to 
proceed with the case.116 
C.  UGANDA AND THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY 
The unrest caused in northern Uganda by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) has deep roots in the history of the 
country and the region as a whole.  Parts of the problem can be 
 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S FIRST YEARS, supra note 102, at 38.  The concept 
of ‘complementarity’ is drawn from articles 1 and 10 of the preamble to the Rome 
Statute.  SCHABAS, supra note 97, at 85.  See, e.g., Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony 
Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005, ICC-02/04-01/05 (Sept. 27, 
2005) (Public Redacted Version), available at http://www2.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc97185.pdf. 
 111. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S FIRST YEARS, supra note 102, at 38 (citing Office 
of the Prosecutor, Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases 5 (June 2006) (draft 
policy paper on file with Human Rights Watch)). 
 112. Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 17(1)(d) (“[T]he Court shall determine 
that a case is inadmissible where . . . (d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the Court.”). 
 113. Id. arts. 17, 53(1)(b).  See also, William W. Burke-White & Scott Kaplan, 
Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice: The International Criminal Court and an 
Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 257, 260–61 
(2009). 
 114. Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 17(1)(a); see also SCHABAS, supra note 97, 
at 86 (“The terms ‘unwilling’ and ‘unable’ are explained in some detail in Article 17, 
although the enigmatic adjective ‘genuinely’ is left entirely to the appreciation of the 
Court.”). 
 115. Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 17(2)(a)–(c). 
 116. Id. art. 17(3). 
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traced back to the artificial creation of the border between 
Uganda and Sudan by the British, dividing the population of the 
Acholi people.117  More recently, in 1980, the elections after the 
overthrow of Idi Amin returned Milton Obote to power, but were 
widely viewed to be fraudulent.118  This led Yoweri Museveni, 
who had helped in the overthrow of Amin, to form the National 
Resistance Army (NRA) and begin an insurgency in the 
country.119  Six years later, Acholi soldiers within the Ugandan 
army revolted, deposed Obote, and signed a peace agreement 
with the NRA.120  However, the NRA ignored the agreement and 
seized the capital, driving the Acholi soldiers back north, with 
Museveni becoming President.121  Many of the Acholi crossed 
the border and sought safety with their ethnic kin in southern 
Sudan.122  The cycle of state persecution and the subsequent 
formation of resistance groups continued, this time in the north 
with Acholi and other groups that had supported the previous 
government.123 
In 1988 President Museveni’s government signed a peace 
agreement with the largest resistance group.124  Those unwilling 
to surrender joined a minor rebel group led by Joseph Kony.125  
By 1990, he led the only significant armed group still fighting in 
the North, which came to be called the Lord’s Resistance 
 
 117. Tim Allen relates how the border between Uganda and Sudan was created: 
The formation and classification of “tribes” to some extent pre-dated the 
process of finally deciding where the border between Sudan and Uganda 
should be located.  But this did not stop the boundary being constructed in 
such a way as to divide close related populations.  Some “Acholi” groups 
were in fact deliberately included in Sudan, because the British officer 
from the Sudan administration who helped demarcate the boundary line 
thought their chiefs were quite “‘progressive” and he wanted to have some 
in “his” territory, whereas the Ugandan official just wanted to go on leave, 
so he did not care one way or the other. 
ALLEN, supra note 6, at 26–27 (2006). 
 118. Id. at 28–29. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 29–30. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 30.  Many of the Acholi soldiers in southern Sudan then joined a 
militia that was supplied by the Sudanese government because they were fighting 
against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which controlled south Sudan.  
Id. 
 123. Id. at 30–31. 
 124. Id. at 36, 38 (The rebel group that surrendered was the Uganda People’s 
Democratic Army (UPDA).). 
 125. Id. 
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Army.126  Since then, the LRA has continued to destabilize the 
region, abducting or killing thousands of people and causing 
mass displacement.127  Over the years, Museveni’s government 
has attempted several military campaigns and peace 
negotiations, including an offer of amnesty in 1999 for any LRA 
rebels who laid down their arms.128  Some rebels accepted the 
amnesty offer, but none of the attempts to end the insurrection, 
through peace or conflict, have succeeded.  In December 2003, 
President Museveni officially referred the situation involving 
the LRA to the International Criminal Court.129  In conjunction 
with the referral, Museveni excluded the leadership of the LRA 
from the previous amnesty offer.130 
LRA leaders have now cited the ICC indictments as the only 
major barrier to continued peace negotiations.131  However, 
Uganda does not have control over the ICC indictments, so even 
if a peace agreement were signed, the top leaders would still be 
subject to the ICC arrest warrants.  This impasse has led the 
Ugandan government to form a special war crimes chamber in 
their judiciary and consider asking the ICC to transfer the LRA 
indictments to that court.132  The government of Uganda hopes 
that the potential to hold trials in the country, and therefore 
provide the rebel leaders with the chance to present their case 
to the Ugandan people, will bring the rebels back to peace 
negotiations.133 
 
 126. Id. at 39. 
 127. Id. at 53–71.  See Stephanie McCrummen, Ugandan Rebels Kill 189 People 
in 3 Days in NE Congo, U.N. Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2008, at A10. 
 128. E.g., ALLEN, supra note 6, 47–49, 72–82.  There are also several potential 
reasons that the war could be useful to Museveni, including cementing his political 
base in the southern part of the country and providing a useful, barbaric opponent to 
limit opposition.  During this time the LRA also began to get considerable support 
from the government in Sudan in order to fight against groups in south Sudan and 
in retaliation for Museveni’s support of them.  Id.  The African Union also 
authorized renewed military action against the LRA in a special summit held 
August 31, 2009.  Special Session of the Assembly of the Union on the Consideration 
and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa, Aug. 31, 2009, Plan of Action, ¶ 8(ix), 
SP/Assembly/PS/Plan(I), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/ar/index/ 
Special_Summit/Plan%20of%20Action-%20Final%20_Eng%20_.pdf. 
 129. President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) to the ICC, supra note 11. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Wheeler, supra note 5. 
 132. Uganda Sets Up War Crimes Court, BBC NEWS, May 26, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7420461.stm. 
 133. Uganda Rebels in Fresh Truce Call, supra note 13.  But cf. Joel Ogwang, 
Kony Must be Tried at the ICC, Says Judge, NEW VISION (Uganda), May 12, 2009, 
available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/681108. 
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II.  FROM THE ICC WITH LOVE  
It is theoretically possible for the ICC to transfer the LRA 
indictments to Uganda.  A brief look at the current options 
available, however, demonstrates the utility of a specific, formal 
transfer mechanism.  Currently, there is not a clear method for 
the ICC to divest itself of cases.  This section explores how the 
ICC could transfer the LRA indictments to Uganda under the 
current rules and then considers how a rule modeled on the 
ICTR’s 11 bis motions could be crafted as a more effective route 
to shift cases back to national jurisdictions if necessary. 
A.  CURRENT FRAMEWORK TO TRANSFER CASES FROM THE ICC 
There are several ways that Uganda could attempt to have 
the indictments transferred to its judiciary.  The most obvious 
method would be to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court under 
Article 19 of the Rome Statute.134  Article 19 allows a state to 
challenge the admissibility or jurisdiction of the ICC if that 
state has jurisdiction and is investigating or prosecuting the 
case.135  A request by Uganda to prosecute the LRA indictments 
in its own judicial system potentially negates the admissibility 
of the cases to the ICC under Article 17, which requires the ICC 
to “determine a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over 
it . . . .”136  For this challenge to work, Uganda would also need 
 
 134. Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 19. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 17.  See also Int’l Criminal Court, Paper 
on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor 4 (Sept. 2003), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/ 
143594/030905_Policy_ Paper.pdf. 
With regard to paragraph 10 of the preamble and Article 1, the Court shall 
determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the 
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely 
to prosecute; 
The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the 
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under 
article 20, paragraph 3; 
The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. 
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to prove that it is willing and genuinely able to carry out the 
prosecutions.137 
The ICC, however, has several coherent arguments it could 
use to deny transfer.  Cases of self-referral from a state party 
were not generally contemplated when the Rome Statute was 
drafted.138  Uganda specifically requested that the ICC take 
jurisdiction over the LRA cases in the first instance, and the 
legality and consequences of a request to challenge admissibility 
after such a referral are not clear.  The ICC could simply claim 
that Uganda is not genuinely able to prosecute the cases.  This 
determination was presumably made when the ICC originally 
accepted the cases.139  The ICC could find the proposed war 
crimes chamber of the High Court of Uganda inadequate to 
overturn the previous finding of an inability to prosecute.  A 
decision along those lines, however, is a very blunt instrument 
and risks undermining domestic support for a war crimes 
chamber and for the ICC.140 
The language of Articles 17 and 19 does not make the 
concept of transferring cases back to national jurisdictions a 
simple legal question.  William W. Burke-White and Scott 
Kaplan note that under the language of Article 19(4)–(5) it is 
possible that there is actually no procedural mechanism for 
Uganda to challenge admissibility before the ICC at this stage 
in the process.141  Article 19 states in part: “The admissibility of 
a case or the jurisdiction of the Court may be challenged only 
once by any person or State . . . . A State . . . shall make a 
challenge at the earliest opportunity.”142  Almost five years have 
 
Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 17. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 113, at 259. 
 139. The hearing regarding the request for the transmission of warrants was in 
closed session and is under seal.  See, Transcript of Procedural Matters Hearing, 
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC 02/04, (June 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc238384.pdf; Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case 
No. ICC 02/04, Decision to Hold a Hearing on the Request Under Rule 176 Made in 
the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest Under Article 58, ICC-02/04 
(June 9, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc271809.pdf. 
 140. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 141. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 113.  See Rome Statute, supra note 98, 
art. 17.  
 142. Article 19 (4)–(5) states: 
The admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction of the Court may be 
challenged only once by any person or State referred to in paragraph 2.  
The challenge shall take place prior to or at the commencement of the trial.  
In exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave for a challenge to 
be brought more than once or at a time later than the commencement of 
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passed since Uganda originally referred the case to the ICC and 
the referral itself can be seen as an admission that Uganda was 
not able to try the case.  Uganda could argue that circumstances 
have changed and that only now is it able to effectively 
prosecute the cases.  But the success of such an argument is far 
from guaranteed and there is no clear reason why Uganda could 
not have created a special chamber to try the cases at the time 
of the initial referral. 
Burke-White and Kaplan also explore several other legal 
arguments that the ICC could make in order to refuse a transfer 
request by Uganda.  One would use Article 17 to claim that, by 
requesting transfer, Uganda is attempting to shield the accused 
from prosecution.143  They also make a more general estoppel 
argument, stating that the ICC relied on Uganda’s self-referral 
in proceeding with an investigation.144  These potential methods 
to transfer the indictments back to Uganda, however, are 
inferior options behind a more specific mechanism to handle 
transfer requests.  Such a rule would be beneficial to the Court 
and the international community as a whole; its advantages will 
be explored in the next section. 
B.  ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL TRANSFER MECHANISM FOR THE ICC 
The ICTR’s Rule 11 bis provides an excellent template to 
consider a similar rule for the ICC.  This section will examine 
how the basic outline of Rule 11 bis, with some modifications, 
would provide a much more comprehensive approach to address 
the legal and fair trial issues surrounding the transfer of a case 
from the ICC to a national jurisdiction.  It will also look at some 
of the potential issues raised by the addition of a transfer 
mechanism to the ICC. 
 
the trial.  Challenges to the admissibility of a case, at the commencement 
of a trial, or subsequently with the leave of the Court, may be based only on 
article 17, paragraph 1 (c). 
A State referred to in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) shall make a challenge at the 
earliest opportunity. 
Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 19 (4)–(5). 
 143. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 113, at 262. 
 144. Id.  Their article then lays out three separate ways to view the 
admissibility requirement: “a fundamental right of the accused, a means to protect 
state sovereignty, or a basic limitation on the power of the Court.”  Id.  The article 
goes on to evaluate the prospects of a challenge by Uganda under each viewpoint.  
Id. at 263–68. 
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1.  A Clear Framework for Addressing Country Concerns 
Adopting a transfer mechanism provides a clear framework 
to address concerns about whether or not a case should actually 
be tried at the ICC.  The Uganda situation is an excellent 
example of how ongoing conflicts continue to evolve, even after 
indictments have been handed down.145  The Ugandan 
government, or a subsequent administration, could change its 
stance on the efficacy of ICC indictments in light of evolving 
peace negotiations with the LRA or changes in public sentiment.  
Arguably, the ICC indictments are now the only major barrier to 
the peace process.  A transfer mechanism would channel those 
concerns into a formal process and allow the ICC to address 
them directly.  Even if the Trial Chamber eventually finds that 
the indictments should not be transferred to the country in 
question, the rule allows the state to be heard and make its case 
for such a transfer. 
In order to promote better communication between the ICC 
and requesting countries, the countries themselves should be 
able to request the transfer of cases; under the current rule for 
the ICTR, only the Prosecutor and Trial Chamber may do so.  
Transfer request hearings add another layer of accountability to 
the ICC in exchange for the small increased burden of holding 
them at the request of States.  While such a motion could 
provide political cover for a government to shift negative public 
attitudes about trials to the Court, that risk exists even without 
the proposed rule.  Under the current rules it could actually be 
easier to shift blame to the ICC because the State could 
legitimately argue that its hands have been tied, whereas with 
the new rule a country would actually have to go through the 
motions of attempting to retrieve the case, running the risk of 
getting what it asks for. 
It is important for the Court to keep open communication 
with the countries it works with, especially as it strives to 
increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community.  The ICC’s reputation would be damaged if it was 
seen as either unaccountable or insensitive to the concerns of 
partner countries.  A state is more likely to cooperate with the 
ICC if it feels more like an equal partner. 
States also have vast potential to improve the condition of 
the country following the conclusion of a conflict.  Rwanda is a 
 
 145. The indictment of the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, by the ICC is 
another example of an indictment in the middle of an ongoing conflict. 
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great example, especially given the state of the country and its 
judiciary in the wake of the genocide.146  International 
investigations and indictments might be necessary to keep the 
judicial process moving forward while a country begins to 
recover, but as a country emerges from crisis and begins to 
develop its judiciary, a time could come when the state feels 
ready to take on its own trials.  If a country’s judicial system 
reaches that point, bringing the trials closer to the people 
affected by the crimes has a much greater impact on the people 
and the recovery of the country, and can assist in developing the 
capacity of the state’s judiciary.147 
Transfer requests, however, also bring increased scrutiny to 
a country, which can severely damage its reputation in the 
international community.  While Rwanda’s recent history is 
unique, many of the issues facing it are not.  Still, these issues 
are disproportionately highlighted in a country like Rwanda.  
Rwanda has had increased attention focused on its judicial 
system by the transfer requests and the history of the West’s 
involvement with the genocide.148  Along with the media and 
NGO focus comes the risk of portraying Rwanda’s issues as 
unusual on the international stage when many of the problems 
are relatively commonplace in the region.149  Rwanda continues 
to compete with its neighbors and the rest of the world for 
 
 146.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM 
IN RWANDA, supra note 84, at 12 (noting that the number of available judges fell 
from around 600 to 237 in August of 1994, with only 53 sitting in courts with 
jurisdiction over serious crimes.  “Similar losses had thinned the ranks of 
prosecutors, judicial officers, police officers, clerks, and lawyers.”). 
 147. See U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE OF 
LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES: PROSECUTION INITIATIVES 30 (2006), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46cebb6c2.html.  See also, Jane E. 
Stromseth, Strengthening Demand for the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies, 18 
MINN. J. INT’L L. 415, 422–23 (2009); Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for 
Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 251, 265–67 (2007).  The same concept can also be seen in the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution insuring “a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 148. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COURTING HISTORY: THE LANDMARK 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S FIRST YEARS, supra note 102. 
 149. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS IN 2008, at 19 
(2008) (“At least 362 people were known to have been sentenced to death in 19 
African countries”).  Rwanda was ranked 102 in Transparency International’s 2008 
Corruption Perception Index; tied with Tanzania and above the rest of its neighbors 
(DRC (171), Burundi (158), Uganda (126)).  Transparency International, CPI 2008 
Table, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2009). 
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foreign direct investment and is trying to become the regional 
hub for services.150  Increased attention on the negative aspects 
of society can place the country at a serious disadvantage.  
While much of the criticism is warranted, such as condemning 
the potential of life in prison in solitary confinement, the sudden 
attention on one aspect of a country that might not otherwise 
come to light seriously hindered efforts to improve its overall 
image in comparison with less reported on countries in the 
region. 
2.  Assists in the Development of Domestic Judicial Systems 
Decisions on transfer motions can also serve as vehicles for 
feedback to states on the condition of their judicial systems in 
relation to international norms.  Transfer motions would create 
a dialogue between countries and the ICC that could drive 
improvements in national judiciaries.  The motions would also 
help facilitate the development of international standards and 
best practices towards which other countries could strive.  The 
possibility of trying a high profile case in a domestic court could 
be a powerful incentive to make necessary improvements to the 
national judicial system.  Failing to allow cases to be transferred 
would completely forego this valuable motivation.151 
The interplay between the ICTR and the Rwandan 
government is a great example.  In 2007, Rwanda eliminated 
the death penalty, and it is now building a new prison to house 
accused transferred from the ICTR.152  Both of these actions 
were in direct response to the potential to accept transfer 
 
 150. The Genocide in Rwanda: The Difficulty of Trying to Stop it from Ever 
Happening Again, ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 2009, at 45; Fareed Zakaria, Africa’s New 
Path: Paul Kagame Charts a Way Forward, NEWSWEEK, July 27, 2009, at 55; An 
East African Federation: Big Ambitions, Big Question-Marks, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 
2009, at 52. 
 151. One counter-argument could be raised from the relationship between 
Rwanda and the ICTR.  Rwanda is still working on improving their judicial system 
to address the concerns of the ICTR even after the Tribunal initially denied 
transferring any cases to Rwanda.  Gashegu Muramira, Rwanda: Parliament to 
Discuss ICTR Concerns, NEW TIMES (Rwanda), Nov. 4, 2008, available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200811040076.html.  The main concerns of the ICTR, 
however, are easier to address than the assertion that the government is completely 
unable to prosecute the case or is trying to shield the accused from prosecution. 
 152. Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Amicus 
Curiae Brief of the Republic of Rwanda in the Matter of an Application for the 
Referral of the Above Case to Rwanda Pursuant to Rule 11bis, ¶¶ 31, 59 (Dec. 21, 
2007) (on file with author). 
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cases.153  The Rwandan parliament is now considering further 
changes in light of the Appeals Chamber’s denial of the transfer 
request of the case against Munyakazi.154 
The potential of trying cases pending before the ICTR has 
brought issues with the Rwandan judiciary to the fore and 
fueled the political will to address them.  A positive effect of this 
international attention is that it applies further pressure to 
institute improvements to the judicial system.155 
On the other hand, a request to transfer jurisdiction to a 
national court could also have a negative impact on the ICC and 
the country involved.  Transfer requests could add more stress 
to already strained relations with African countries, and could 
potentially spread the feelings of discontent and colonialism to 
anywhere else the ICC might bring cases.  Denying the transfer 
after significant progress and work is put into improving the 
judiciary (and even creating a separate venue, as in the case of 
Uganda) would be deeply insulting to the country and could 
spark significant feelings of animosity towards the Court.  If the 
ICC does not grant a transfer request, it is essentially 
condemning a country’s judiciary as not adequate or up to 
international standards.  It does not help that the current 
indictments are also only in African countries.156  At the same 
time, the current situation does not allow a country to request 
the transfer of cases back to their own soil.  Instead, countries 
must resign themselves to letting the international court try the 
cases at The Hague. 
The indictment of Omar al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, 
provides another example of potential backlash to a decision by 
the ICC.  At its annual meeting the African Union passed a 
resolution stating that the members would not cooperate with 
the ICC regarding the arrest of President Bashir.157  South 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Muramira, supra note 151. 
 155. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL 
REFORM IN RWANDA, supra note 84. 
 156. The ICC is investigating or is involved in proceedings in connection to 
alleged war crimes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, the Central 
African Republic, and Sudan.  See Int’l Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, 
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/. 
 157. Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), ¶ 10, Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) (July 3, 
2009), http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Conferences/2009/july/summit/decisions/ 
ASSEMBLY%20AU%20DEC%20243%20-%20267%20(XIII)%20_E.pdf; African Union 
in Rift with Court, BBC NEWS, July 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
8133925.stm. 
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Africa is the only AU member to state that they would arrest 
Bashir if he came to the country.158  One-hundred and sixty-four 
African human rights and civil society organizations also issued 
a statement calling on African states party to the ICC to 
reaffirm their commitment and obligation to cooperate with the 
Court.159  Still, a majority of the African Union countries 
supported the resolution, and open defiance of the Court 
significantly damages its legitimacy and ability to enforce its 
indictments. 
3.  Safeguards for Proper Jurisdiction 
The proposed rule also has significant safeguards to ensure 
that a competent court receives the case.  The three options for 
jurisdiction found in Rule 11 bis would be equally valuable to 
the ICC to determine which countries could initially be 
considered for transfer.  The ability to transfer cases to 
countries where the crime was committed would encompass 
situations such as Uganda’s, where the national government 
now considers itself able to prosecute the cases.160  These 
countries also have the most significant stake in the outcome of 
the prosecutions and there are advantages to keeping justice as 
close to the affected people as possible.161  The second 
jurisdictional hook allows countries where the accused was 
arrested to prosecute the case.  This increases the number of 
countries to which a case could be moved, and takes advantage 
of national legislation adopted specifically for that purpose.162  
Finally, the third catchall provision (countries that have 
 
 158. SA Will Enforce Bashir Warrant, TIMES (South Africa), July 31, 2009, 
available at http://www.timeslive.co.za/news/article222.ece. 
 159. African Civil Society Urges African States Parties to the Rome Statute to 
Reaffirm Their Commitment to the ICC, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, July 30, 2009, 
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/30/african-civil-society-urges-
african-states-parties-rome-statute-reaffirm-their-commi. 
The African Union responded to the organizations with a press release 
reminding them how the Union decision making body operates and that the decision 
was made by consensus (with one reservation).  Press Release, African Union, 
Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int’l 
Criminal Court (July 14, 2009), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Conferences/2009/july/Press%20Release%20-%20ICC.doc. 
 160. Following the jurisdiction given in ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(A)(i). 
 161. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What 
Impact on Building the Rule of Law?, supra note 147, at 260–61. 
 162. E.g., Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-97-I, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to 
France (Nov. 20, 2007). 
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jurisdiction and are “willing and adequately prepared to accept 
such a case”163) allows the ICC to transfer cases to countries 
that have universal jurisdiction laws.  In the context of the ICC 
it would also be important to limit jurisdiction to countries that 
have ratified the Rome Statute and therefore have recognized 
the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
All of these options increase the ICC’s ability to adjust to 
individual circumstances in order to best meet the Court’s goal 
of trying “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community” while insuring that the affected communities also 
achieve a sense of justice.164  The ability to share the caseload of 
international crimes will become increasingly important as more 
cases fall under the Court’s temporal and geographic 
jurisdiction.  In the ICTR’s experience, this flexibility has been 
important as it tries to reduce its caseload. 
4.  Limits on the Transfer of Cases 
Simply having jurisdiction to accept a case and request a 
hearing does not mean that the case would be transferred.  In 
line with Rule 11 bis and the Rome Statute, the proposed rule 
would require the ICC to make sure that the accused would 
receive a fair trial and that the death penalty would not be 
imposed.165  Ensuring a fair trial in transfer cases helps to 
maintain the legitimacy of international justice and provides an 
important check for the ICC on where and if cases are 
ultimately transferred.  The ICTR 11 bis cases not only 
demonstrate that a high bar can be set for transferring cases—
they provide a detailed examination of some of the factors 
necessary to ensure a fair trial.  Similar considerations could be 
developed by the ICC, drawing on ICTR jurisprudence and 
many other international sources for fair trial standards.166 
 
 163. ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(A)(iii). 
 164. Rome Statute, supra note 98, pmbl. 
 165. The prohibition on the death penalty appears to be in accord with the Rome 
Statute from the negative inference that death is not one of the sanctioned penalties 
under Article 77.  Id. art. 77. 
 166. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 
14, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976).  U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Subcomm. on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, The Right to a Fair Trial: Current Recognition and 
Measures Necessary for its Strengthening, Final Report, United Nations, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24 (June 3 1994) (prepared by Stanislav Chernichenko and 
William Treat); ANDREW GROTRIAN, ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (1994); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR 
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The ICC can also deny transfer under its mandate to 
address “unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity” and to try the most important cases to 
the international community.167  Many cases referred to the ICC 
will be too important to the international community for them to 
be transferred to national courts.  The ICC also lends a high 
profile to cases, which in turn can help to end cultures of 
impunity while increasing the legitimacy of international law.  
The decision not to transfer Bagaragaza to Norway is a good 
example.  The ICTR Appeals Chamber denied the transfer 
mainly because they were unwilling to have Bagaragaza face 
trial for the lesser charge of homicide instead of genocide, even 
with the ability to provide a comparable sentence if convicted.  
The Tribunal recognized the importance of the gravity of the 
specific charge filed. 
A determination based on importance could be quick and 
decisive, limiting the burden on the Court of multiple requests 
for the transfer of a case to other courts.  The ICC also faces 
much less pressure to transfer cases than the ICTR does due to 
the permanent nature of the institution.  This rule opens up the 
flexibility to move cases, but it keeps control of the docket firmly 
in the hands of the ICC. 
At the same time, any legal battle between the ICC and a 
country requesting jurisdiction would slow the already glacial 
pace of international proceedings.  International prosecution, by 
its nature, evolves more slowly.  Working with multiple 
countries to investigate the crimes and apprehend the accused 
adds layers of difficulty and time.  Moreover, trials tend to 
involve large numbers of witnesses and last for months as 
serious and often complicated charges are prosecuted.168  
Settling jurisdictional questions could insert years of jail time 
between the charges and an actual trial on the merits.  After the 
accused has been arrested, they are highly likely to be held in 
pre-trail detention.  A pre-trial chamber can confirm charges if 
the accused cannot be found or waives the right to be present, 
but the Rome Statute does not allow a person to be tried in 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS, WHAT IS A FAIR TRIAL?  A BASIC GUIDE TO LEGAL STANDARDS AND 
PRACTICE (2000). 
 167. Rome Statute, supra note 98, pmbl. 
 168. For example, the Butare case, involving six accused, lasted for a total of 726 
trials days.  U.N. SCOR, Report on the Completion Strategy of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 12, S/2009/247 (May 14, 2009).  Trials with only 
one defendant also take considerable time.  For example, the trial of Tharcisse 
Renzaho lasted forty-nine trial days.  Id. ¶ 10. 
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absentia.169  Further, the question of whether a country has 
developed their judiciary enough to accept jurisdiction over a 
case will only become ripe after the accused has been arrested 
and a trial is possible.  Any jurisdictional litigation would 
increase the amount of time an accused remains in pre-trial 
detention. 
The international tribunals have already demonstrated a 
significant tolerance for prolonged pre-trial detention.  The 
courts have found that the gravity of the charges and 
importance of the cases outweigh many violations of the rights 
of the accused.  Two cases from the ICTR provide excellent 
examples.  Juvénal Kajelijeli and Barayagwiza were both 
detained without charge for significant periods of time before 
being transferred to the ICTR and before their first 
appearances.  Barayagwiza was detained in Cameroon for 19 
months without being indicted, and another 96 days passed 
between his transfer to the ICTR and his first appearance.170  
The Appeals Chamber initially ruled that he should be released 
and the charges against him dismissed.171  But in a petition for 
rehearing, the Chamber reversed its ruling after the Prosecutor 
presented evidence that the delays were, in part, not in his 
control, and held that Barayagwiza’s sentence should be reduced 
if found guilty.172  In its decision, the Appeals Chamber noted 
the gravity of the charges warranted some departure for the 
international standards on pre-trial detention.173 
Kajelijeli was detained in Benin for 85 days without being 
charged and experienced further delays before his initial 
 
 169. Rome Statute, supra note 98, art. 63 (“The accused shall be present during 
the trial.”); Id. art. 61, cl. 2. 
 170. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals Chamber, 
Decision ¶¶ 2–3 (Nov. 3, 1999). 
 171. Id. ¶ 113. 
 172. The government of Rwanda was also furious and applied political pressure, 
including stopping cooperation with the Tribunal and delaying numerous trials.  
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration, ¶ 24 (Mar. 31, 2000).  Barayagwiza’s 
sentence was eventually reduced from life to thirty-five years in prison by the trial 
court.  Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, 
Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment and Sentence ¶¶ 1106–07 (Dec. 
3, 2003). 
 173. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, Decision, ¶ 62 (Nov. 3, 
1999), (“The Appeals Chamber recognises that international standards view 
provisional (or pre-trial) detention as an exception, rather than the rule.  However, 
in light of the gravity of the charges faced by accused persons before the Tribunal, 
provisional detention is often warranted . . . .”). 
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appearance to assign him representation.174  While the Chamber 
found violations of Kajelijeli’s rights, it only proscribed the 
reduction of his sentence if he was found guilty at trial.175  In 
reaching its decision, the chamber stated, “[It] is mindful that it 
must maintain the correct balance between the fundamental 
rights of the accused and the essential interests of the 
international community in the prosecution of persons charged 
with serious violations of international humanitarian law.”176  
Both of these serious delays without charge only resulted in a 
reduction in sentence. 
Cases heard by the ICC will be of similar gravity to the 
cases against Kajelijeli and Barayagwiza.177  The nature of the 
crimes involved mitigate any concerns over a prolonged pre-trial 
detention at the ICC in the same fashion as at the ICTR.  At the 
same time, a lengthy pre-trial delay, followed by a potential 
change in jurisdiction, also raises double jeopardy issues if a 
transfer is requested after substantive pre-trial rulings have 
occurred.  A national court can still provide a fair trial while 
operating under slightly different rules of procedure.  The 
national court could be tempted to reconsider previous rulings 
under local law after a case is transferred, especially given the 
highly charged nature of these prosecutions.  Adverse motion 
rulings could also incentivize transfer requests to the national 
jurisdiction in an attempt to gain a more favorable ruling.  
Double jeopardy concerns are also compounded in situations like 
Uganda’s where the country is currently developing the court 
they wish to try the cases in.  Rules could still potentially 
change and evolve, disrupting the ability of the defense to 
prepare for trial. 
Concerns over the length of delay and any double jeopardy 
issues could be addressed by limiting the period of time where a 
transfer request could be brought or requiring the acceptance of 
pre-trial decisions made before transfers.  One option would be 
to establish a fixed window of time between when the 
indictment was filed and when a transfer request could be 
 
 174. Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, Appeals 
Chamber, ¶¶ 231, 237 (23 May 2005). 
 175. Id. ¶¶ 251, 255. 
 176. Id. ¶¶ 206, 255 (quoting Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-
AR73, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Legality of Arrest, ¶ 30 (June 5, 
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 177. The seriousness of cases to be accepted by the Court is clearly stated in the 
preamble to the Rome Statute and reflected in the Court’s current docket.  Rome 
Statute, supra note 98, pmbl.  
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made.178  A more nebulous time frame could also be set by 
precluding requests after pre-defined substantive rulings were 
made.  A time frame for filing, however, would reduce the 
chances that a war-torn country could rehabilitate its judiciary 
quickly enough to prove it could provide a fair trial.  Requiring a 
national court to accept previous decisions could raise 
sovereignty issues and backlash in the country and could be 
difficult to enforce.  The only remedy available to the ICC if a 
national court overturned a decision would be to take back 
jurisdiction of the case. 
5.  Monitoring Transferred Cases 
The final aspect of a transfer mechanism requires a country 
to allow the Prosecutor to monitor the proceedings of the 
national court and revoke the transfer of jurisdiction if 
necessary.179  Monitoring is an important final check on 
countries that have cases transferred to them from the ICC.  
Monitoring cases in the context of the ICC also has significantly 
more teeth than it does for the ICTR because the ICC is a 
permanent body and will exist for the duration of the trials in 
the national courts, unlike the ICTR, which is set to complete all 
cases at the trial level by the end of 2010.180  Monitoring trials 
could also contribute to further cooperation between the 
international community and national judiciaries through 
increased access to and attention on the national courts.  
Monitors and international attention could continue to pressure 
the judicial system to make as many improvements as possible. 
6.  Unique Advantages to the ICC 
On top of the increased interaction with national 
judiciaries, a transfer mechanism could become an important 
tool to allow the ICC greater control over its docket as the ICC 
gains legitimacy and begins to take on more cases.  The ability 
to share the caseload from large-scale atrocities could 
 
 178. If the indictment was sealed, the window of time could start when the 
government of the country where the crimes occurred was notified of the charges.  
The country could be notified in secret and file a request under seal.  This route 
would preclude third countries from requesting jurisdiction, but they also hold less 
compelling claims to want to try a particular case.  The time limit could also start 
after the indictment becomes public. 
 179. ICTR R. P. EVID. 11 bis(D)(iv), (F), supra note 95 for full text. 
 180. S.C. Res. 1878, ¶ 3 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1878 (July 7, 2009). 
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dramatically increase the ability of courts to try those most 
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
Depending on the specifics of a conflict and the capacity of the 
national courts in the country affected, the ICC could retain the 
trials of the most senior accused and share a second echelon of 
perpetrators with countries that have universal jurisdiction 
laws and are willing to take the cases.  Working in conjunction 
with national courts, a case-by-case sliding scale approach could 
be developed to determine what level of culpability each court 
would address. 
Rwanda provides one example of such a relationship.  While 
the ICTR is trying those bearing the greatest responsibility, 
Rwanda has been addressing a second tier of perpetrators 
through the national judiciary and ad-hoc, community-led 
gacaca courts.181  The increased prosecution of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity would be a distinct improvement over 
not trying the cases at all.  Even if the trial occurred in the less 
desirable context of a distant third country, it would still further 
the goal of ending impunity by bringing war criminals to justice. 
This Note is not advocating for a dramatic expansion of 
international criminal prosecutions.  National jurisdictions have 
not been clamoring to take even the limited number of cases 
that the ICTR has attempted to transfer.  It is questionable 
whether the ICC could currently handle as many trials as the 
ICTR on top of the four situations it is investigating and intends 
to prosecute.182  The ICTR has charged seventy-seven people in 
connection with the genocide in Rwanda and has caught 
seventy-five of them.183  The ICC has limited time and 
resources, and the ability to address more cases related to a 
specific conflict through transferring some of them to other 
courts would improve the impact of criminal prosecutions. 
Further alleviating the ICC’s burden, the proposed rule 
could help convince some of the large countries not currently 
party to the Rome Statute to ratify the treaty, or at least to 
participate in the ICC Review Conference scheduled for 2010.  
Increased accountability measures for the ICC in the form of a 
 
 181. For more on the gacaca courts see supra note 86.  While the national 
prosecutions have been called into serious question in the case of Rwanda, the idea 
of sharing the burden of trials and healing the country to move beyond the atrocities 
is still important.  The international community is not equipped to handle the vast 
number of low-level cases that arise out of such conflicts. 
 182. Int’l Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, supra note 156. 
 183. U.N. SCOR, Thirteenth Annual Report of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/209–S/2008/514 (Aug. 4, 2008). 
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transfer mechanism could help to allay fears of political 
prosecutions and provide space for countries to raise concerns 
regarding individual cases.  In the event of high profile 
indictments against political figures, the ability to transfer the 
case to the state party concerned over the matter is a middle-
ground position that could be palatable to the international 
community while still pursuing justice.  This method could work 
especially for Russia, the United States, and Israel, which have 
all officially signed the Rome Statute, but have not yet ratified 
it.184  Their status as signatories could be leveraged to allow 
them to attend the conference and participate in the 
negotiations on changes to the Statute.  The more these 
countries buy into the process and shaping of the Court, the 
greater chance they will ratify the treaty and increase the 
legitimacy of the ICC. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
When the Rome Statute was drafted, the idea that the 
majority of the Court’s cases would come from referrals from 
State parties was never conceived.185  Issues with confidential 
information provided to the Prosecutor by the U.N. mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo almost derailed the trial 
of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.186  New challenges will continue to 
arise from the first trial that started in January 2009 and as the 
ICC continues to break new ground in international criminal 
law.  The realization that the ICC needed improvement was 
part of the impetus for setting the 2010 Review Conference.  
One of the lessons learned since the treaty was first signed is 
that the ICC needs further procedural rules to be as effective 
and flexible as possible in the constantly evolving landscape of 
 
 184. Israel and the United States have expressly stated that they do not intend 
to ratify the treaty.  Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State, International Criminal 
Court: Letter to Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm; Office of the Legal Adviser to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (Israel), Israel and the International Criminal Court (June 2002), 
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/6/ 
Israel%20and%20the%20International%20Criminal%20Court. 
 185. Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 113, at 259. 
 186. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Stay of Proceedings in the Lubanga 
Case is Lifted—Trial Provisionally Scheduled for 26 January 2009, ICC-CPI-
200081118-PR372 (Nov. 18, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/ 
Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/Press+Releases+(2008)/ (follow “Stay of 
Proceedings in the Lubanga Case is Lifted” hyperlink). 
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international criminal law.  A rule styled on the ICTR’s 
Rule 11 bis, smoothing requests and the potential transfer of 
cases to national courts, is one such procedural rule, and should 
be adopted to strengthen this important international 
institution. 
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Appendix* 
DRAFT AMENDMENT 
Transfer of the Indictment to States Party to the Rome Statute 
(A) If an indictment has been confirmed, whether or not the 
accused is in the custody of the Court, the President may 
designate a Trial Chamber which shall determine whether 
the case should be referred to the authorities of a State 
Party to the Rome Statute: 
(i)  in whose territory the crime was committed; or 
(ii) in which the accused was arrested; or 
(iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately 
prepared to accept such a case, so that those authorities 
should forthwith refer the case to the appropriate court 
for trial within that State. 
(B) The Trial Chamber may order such referral proprio motu, 
at the request of the Prosecutor, or at the request of a State 
Party, after having given the Prosecutor, the State Party, 
and, where the accused is in the custody of the Court, the 
accused, the opportunity to be heard. 
(C) In determining whether to refer the case in accordance with 
paragraph (A), the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that 
the accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State 
 
* The appendix contains proposed language for a transfer mechanism for the ICC.  
The language of the proposed rule closely parallels Rule 11 bis from the ICTR.  The 
rule change could be implemented in one of two ways.  It could be added by either 
directly amending the Rome Statute or by amending the ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.  Amending either requires a two-thirds majority of States Parties.  Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, arts. 
51(2), 123(3) (entered into force July 1, 2002).  The most logical place to insert a 
transfer mechanism in the Rome Statute would be in Part II “Jurisdiction, 
Admissibility and Applicable Law.”  In the Rules of Procedure and Evidence it could 
be inserted in section three of the chapter on jurisdiction and admissibility: 
“Challenges and preliminary rulings under articles 17, 18 and 19.”  ICC R. P. EVID. 
Ch. 3, § 3.  There have not been any amendments to the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence to date and it is not clear if the Court would re-number the rules after an 
amendment or follow the ICTR method (e.g. 11 bis). 
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concerned and that the death penalty will not be imposed or 
carried out. 
(D) Where an order is issued pursuant to this Rule:  
(i) the accused, if in the custody of the Court, shall be 
handed over to the authorities of the State concerned; 
(ii) the Trial Chamber may order that protective measures 
for certain witnesses or victims remain in force; 
(iii) the Prosecutor shall provide to the authorities of the 
State concerned all of the information relating to the 
case which the Prosecutor considers appropriate and, in 
particular, the material supporting the indictment; 
(iv) the State Party shall accept all pre-trial rulings made 
by the ICC prior to the transfer; 
(v) the Prosecutor may send observers to monitor the 
proceedings in the courts of the State concerned on his 
or her behalf. 
(E) The Trial Chamber may issue a warrant for the arrest of 
the accused, which shall specify the State to which he is to 
be transferred for trial. 
